The bill has not yet been passed, and of course there may be amendments or it may not pass at all.  However, now is the time to take a serious look at your situation if you are in a “common law” relationship.

Of particular relevance to those in “common law” relationships is the proposed transitional section 252 of Bill 16.   Section 252 provides that if you have an executed agreement regarding property, or if you have started a court proceeding regarding property division, before the act comes into effect, then the old Family Relations Act will apply to your case.  If you are in a common law spouse with the lion’s share of the property and considering separating, get to a lawyer to discuss your options as soon as possible.  Delaying could be very costly.

1. In a situation in which both parties have joint custody and joint guardianship of the children:
   1. Pursuant to s. 29(1) of the Family Relations Act, if a joint guardian dies, the surviving guardian will continue as sole guardian of the children.
   2. In a situation  in which one party is the sole guardian of the children and the other party has no guardianship or custodial rights:
      1. Pursuant to s. 29(2) of the Family Relations Act, if the sole guardian dies, a surviving parent of the children who is not a guardian at the time of the deceased’s death does not become a guardian unless the parent has been appointed under section 50 of the Infants Act or is, by order, appointed under section 30 of the Family Relations Act.

That section of the Infants Act states:

1. i.      That a parent may appoint, by deed if (the parent is) under age, otherwise by deed or will, a guardian to act in his or her place on his or her death as guardian of an infant child under 19 years; and,
2. ii.      If either parent dies, the surviving parent may by will transfer part or all of his or her rights and duties to custody, control and management of their infant child’s property, but not the infant’s services and earnings, to a suitable person.
3. Pursuant to s.  30 (1) of the Family Relations Act, a court may, on application:
   1. i.      appoint a guardian, or
   2. ii.      remove from office a guardian appointed or acting by virtue of this Part or a deed or testamentary appointment.
4. Pursuant to s.  30 (2) of the Family Relations Act, if a child is over 12 years of age, a court must not make or give effect under subsection (1) to an appointment unless:
   1. i.      the child consents in writing to the appointment, or
   2. ii.      if the child withholds consent to the appointment, the court is satisfied that the appointment is necessary in the best interests of the child.
5. Pursuant to s.  30 (3) of the Family Relations Act,  a person other than the father or mother of a child must not, under subsection (1) (a), be appointed guardian unless the court is satisfied that each parent of the child consents in writing to the appointment or, if a necessary consent has not been given, that:
   1. i.      the parent who could give or withhold consent is not reasonably available, or
   2. ii.      the consent is being unreasonably withheld.
6. Pursuant to s.  30 (4) of the Family Relations Act, an order must not be made under subsection (1) unless the present and prospective guardians have been given notice and an opportunity to be heard in the proceeding.
7. Finally, s 30 (5) of the Family Relations Act stipulates that if satisfied that circumstances warrant, the court may grant an exemption from subsection (4) respecting a present guardian.

Planning for your children’s future is a complex task and the intersection of family law and estate law makes it doubly so.

The best way to ensure that your wishes with respect to any issue being carried out after your death and that your children’s best interests are protected to is to obtain advice from independent legal counsel who can direct you through this legislative maze.  Here at Henderson Heinrichs our lawyers are capable of advising you with respect to such a complicated issue.

Special or extraordinary expenses

7. (1) In a child support order the court may, on either spouse’s request, provide for an amount to cover all or any portion of the following expenses, which expenses may be estimated, taking into account the necessity of the expense in relation to the child’s best interests and the reasonableness of the expense in relation to the means of the spouses and those of the child and to the family’s spending pattern prior to the separation:

(a) child care expenses incurred as a result of the custodial parent’s employment, illness, disability or education or training for employment;

(b) that portion of the medical and dental insurance premiums attributable to the child;

(c) health related expenses that exceed insurance reimbursement by at least $100 annually, including orthodontic treatment, professional counselling provided by a psychologist, social worker, psychiatrist or any other person, physiotherapy, occupational therapy, speech therapy and prescription drugs, hearing aids, glasses and contact lenses;

(d) extraordinary expenses for primary or secondary school education or for any other educational programs that meet the child’s particular needs;

(e) expenses for post-secondary education; and

(f) extraordinary expenses for extracurricular activities.

The question this raises in my mind is why separated or divorced parents are subject to this potential obligation when children of parents still together are subject to the vagaries of their parents’ decision.  Would a child of parents who are still together be able to secure similar funding if the courts were asked to intervene?

1. That he did not willfully or deliberately fail to enter an appearance or file a defence to the plaintiff’s claim;
2. That he made application to set aside the default judgment as soon as reasonably possible after obtaining knowledge of the default judgment, or give an explanation for any delay in the application being brought
3. That he has a meritorious defence or at least a defence worthy of investigation; and,
4. That the foregoing requirements will be established to the satisfaction of the court through affidavit material filed by or on behalf of the defendant.

Until that application comes before the court and unless the order is set aside, it is fully valid.  But an order obtained in a contested application is not subject to this provision.  In the end, it’s probably a wash given that it’s generally a little easier to get an order when no one is opposing you.

Currently under the Family Relations Act, persons who have cohabited in a marriage-like relationship for a period of two years are deemed to be in a common-law relationship. This provides them with certain rights upon separation, although those rights are nowhere near those afforded to married couples. Primarily, persons in a common-law relationship can claim spousal support within one year of separation and of course child support in the event there are children; however, there are no rights to the other person’s property unless a claim for trust is brought by way of litigation. Trust claims are complex and fact intensive, making them expensive to litigate.

The new proposals would change the rights of common-law spouses in a significant way. Once the couple has passed the two-year cohabitation mark and become officially common-law, the parties’ property, pensions, presumptively belongs 50/50 to each of them, save and except in particular circumstances, most notably that pre-relationship property would not be subject to this division. In addition, the parties’ post-cohabitation debts, irrespective of who incurred them, would also be split 50/50.

In addition, another category of cohabitating spouses is proposed in the event a common-law couple has a child, but has yet to reach the two-year milestone. In the White Paper, this is described as a couple who have a child and are in “a marriage-like relationship of some permanence”. They would then become subject to the 50/50 division on separation. What exactly that means is not set out in the White Paper, but is sure to be litigated early on if adopted in the changes to the Family Relations Act.

What does this mean? Obviously it is too early to tell, but our initial suspicion is that many couples intent on cohabiting will be proactive and engage in written agreements contracting themselves out of these provisions. We envision that these agreements would be similar to marriage (aka pre-nuptial) agreements, in an effort to protect assets from the new provisions of the Family Relations Act.

Certainly the proposed changes to the Family Relations Act as they relate to common-law spouses indicate that the legislature intends to treat cohabiting spouses as something more akin to married spouses than in the current state of affairs.

-JMH

As a result of the 2002 and 2004 amendments to the Act, the legislation was amended to allow a court to consider an application by the birth father to change the child’s surname to include his surname.

Section 3(6)(c) of the Act states that “if a statement completed by only one parent of the child or by a person who is not the child’s parent is registered, the chief executive officer must alter the registration of birth on application of any of the following persons:

(d) the child’s mother or father, if the application is accompanied by a copy of an order of the court declaring the child’s paternity, unless the court orders that the father’s particulars are not to be included on the child’s registration of birth.”

Section 4 (1) (c) of the Act states that the surname of a child must be registered as follows:

“(c) if both parents complete the statement under section 3, but do not agree on the child’s surname, the surname must be

(i)  the parents’ surname, if they have the same surname, or

(ii)  a surname consisting of both parents’ surnames hyphenated or combined in alphabetical order, if they have different surnames.”

It is now open to the court by virtue of Section 4.1 of the Act that upon an order declaring a child’s parentage that the registration of the child’s name can be changed.  If an order is made in respect of a child’s surname, the court must order the child’s surname to be:

(a) the surname of either parent, or

(b) a surname consisting of both parents’ surnames hyphenated or combined in alphabetical order, in which case, section 4 (2) and (3) applies.

The legislation now provided an avenue for fathers who have been left off of the registration or the process of naming the child, to have a remedy in law in changing the surname.   It should be noted however, that the court will look at the best interests of the child in determining whether the name change should occur.