1. In a situation in which both parties have joint custody and joint guardianship of the children:
   1. Pursuant to s. 29(1) of the Family Relations Act, if a joint guardian dies, the surviving guardian will continue as sole guardian of the children.
   2. In a situation  in which one party is the sole guardian of the children and the other party has no guardianship or custodial rights:
      1. Pursuant to s. 29(2) of the Family Relations Act, if the sole guardian dies, a surviving parent of the children who is not a guardian at the time of the deceased’s death does not become a guardian unless the parent has been appointed under section 50 of the Infants Act or is, by order, appointed under section 30 of the Family Relations Act.

That section of the Infants Act states:

1. i.      That a parent may appoint, by deed if (the parent is) under age, otherwise by deed or will, a guardian to act in his or her place on his or her death as guardian of an infant child under 19 years; and,
2. ii.      If either parent dies, the surviving parent may by will transfer part or all of his or her rights and duties to custody, control and management of their infant child’s property, but not the infant’s services and earnings, to a suitable person.
3. Pursuant to s.  30 (1) of the Family Relations Act, a court may, on application:
   1. i.      appoint a guardian, or
   2. ii.      remove from office a guardian appointed or acting by virtue of this Part or a deed or testamentary appointment.
4. Pursuant to s.  30 (2) of the Family Relations Act, if a child is over 12 years of age, a court must not make or give effect under subsection (1) to an appointment unless:
   1. i.      the child consents in writing to the appointment, or
   2. ii.      if the child withholds consent to the appointment, the court is satisfied that the appointment is necessary in the best interests of the child.
5. Pursuant to s.  30 (3) of the Family Relations Act,  a person other than the father or mother of a child must not, under subsection (1) (a), be appointed guardian unless the court is satisfied that each parent of the child consents in writing to the appointment or, if a necessary consent has not been given, that:
   1. i.      the parent who could give or withhold consent is not reasonably available, or
   2. ii.      the consent is being unreasonably withheld.
6. Pursuant to s.  30 (4) of the Family Relations Act, an order must not be made under subsection (1) unless the present and prospective guardians have been given notice and an opportunity to be heard in the proceeding.
7. Finally, s 30 (5) of the Family Relations Act stipulates that if satisfied that circumstances warrant, the court may grant an exemption from subsection (4) respecting a present guardian.

Planning for your children’s future is a complex task and the intersection of family law and estate law makes it doubly so.

The best way to ensure that your wishes with respect to any issue being carried out after your death and that your children’s best interests are protected to is to obtain advice from independent legal counsel who can direct you through this legislative maze.  Here at Henderson Heinrichs our lawyers are capable of advising you with respect to such a complicated issue.

In Wolfman-Stotland v. Stotland, 2011 BCCA 175, (CanLII) the court grappled with the question of a spouse’s capacity to separate.  In this case, the claimant wife and the respondent husband were  92 and 93 years old respectively, and the wife applied for a  s.57 declaration that there was no reasonable prospect of reconciliation.  In opposing that application, the Husband sought and received an order that a doctor provide an opinion as to the Wife’s capacity to make the  – though the doctor found that the wife had the capacity to instruct counsel regarding the financial aspects of the divorce claimed, she “did not have the capacity to form the intention to live separate and apart from her husband” [at paragraph 14].  The Chambers judge defined the relevant issue as whether the wife had the ability to both manage her affairs and instruct counsel.  The Court found that she did not.

The Court of Appeal disagreed.  Upon re-examination of the issue, the Appeal Court determined there should not have been a dual test.  The ability to manage ones affairs was determined to be a higher capacity than the one needed to instruct counsel and the court overturned the Chambers Judge’s decision.

The Husband’s application to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed, and the test for the capacity necessary to separate therefore remains a very basic one.

Previously, the parties have been separated since 1994. The initial child and spousal support order was made in 1996, and varied in 2004. The 2004 Order specified that, anytime after a year had passed, either party could seek a review hearing on the issue of spousal maintenance. The husband sought that review in 2005, and then again in 2009 when it was alleged the youngest child of the parties was no longer a child of the marriage. The husband sought to terminate spousal support at that point.

At the 2009 application the judge indicated she was relying on Section 17 of the Divorce Act, which relates to the variation of support orders. She concluded the husband ought to keep paying indefinite support to the wife in the amount of $1250.00 per month.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal noted that Section 17 of the Divorce Act is irrelevant in the context of review hearings and should not have been relied on by the judge. Instead, at a review hearing, the judge should have conducted a “reconsideration” of entitlement and quantum of support having an eye to the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, which the Court of Appeal concluded would have assisted the husband in terms of the duration of support.

This decision clarifies the test that a party must satisfy when bringing an application for a review of support as opposed to the test that must be met on an application to vary support. Procedurally, this distinction is important to note as the legal test is markedly different.

Currently under the Family Relations Act, persons who have cohabited in a marriage-like relationship for a period of two years are deemed to be in a common-law relationship. This provides them with certain rights upon separation, although those rights are nowhere near those afforded to married couples. Primarily, persons in a common-law relationship can claim spousal support within one year of separation and of course child support in the event there are children; however, there are no rights to the other person’s property unless a claim for trust is brought by way of litigation. Trust claims are complex and fact intensive, making them expensive to litigate.

The new proposals would change the rights of common-law spouses in a significant way. Once the couple has passed the two-year cohabitation mark and become officially common-law, the parties’ property, pensions, presumptively belongs 50/50 to each of them, save and except in particular circumstances, most notably that pre-relationship property would not be subject to this division. In addition, the parties’ post-cohabitation debts, irrespective of who incurred them, would also be split 50/50.

In addition, another category of cohabitating spouses is proposed in the event a common-law couple has a child, but has yet to reach the two-year milestone. In the White Paper, this is described as a couple who have a child and are in “a marriage-like relationship of some permanence”. They would then become subject to the 50/50 division on separation. What exactly that means is not set out in the White Paper, but is sure to be litigated early on if adopted in the changes to the Family Relations Act.

What does this mean? Obviously it is too early to tell, but our initial suspicion is that many couples intent on cohabiting will be proactive and engage in written agreements contracting themselves out of these provisions. We envision that these agreements would be similar to marriage (aka pre-nuptial) agreements, in an effort to protect assets from the new provisions of the Family Relations Act.

Certainly the proposed changes to the Family Relations Act as they relate to common-law spouses indicate that the legislature intends to treat cohabiting spouses as something more akin to married spouses than in the current state of affairs.

-JMH

If you are getting Married:

Wills in BC are governed by the Wills Act.  Under section 15 of the Wills Act, your will is revoked if you get married, unless your will specifically contemplates your upcoming marriage.  If your will is revoked and you pass away, it will be as though you died with no will at all, and your property will be distributed according to the Estate Administration Act.  So if you get married, make sure you revisit your will if you want your final wishes to be respected.

If you are getting Divorced:

Unlike getting married, getting divorced does not cancel your will.  However, it can change your will.  Any parts of your will that name your former spouse as executor or as a beneficiary of your estate are cancelled.  The division of your estate can be complex and unpredictable if these portions of your will are cancelled.  If you are getting divorced and you named your former spouse in your will, you should seriously consider getting a new will.

If you are separated and planning on getting Divorced.

The process of getting divorced can often take some time.  Even if you are separated from your spouse and have started divorce proceedings, your will is still valid.  If you are separated but not divorced and do not have a will, a substantial portion of your estate will go to your spouse if you pass away before getting divorced.  Under both of these circumstances, you should consider immediately getting a new will which explicitly sets out that you are making the will with your impending divorce in mind, and which reflects your wishes.